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When an Exception is just an Exception: Slavoj Zizek’s The Fright of 
Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and Post-Theory 
Sheila Skaff and Chris Luebbe
Slavoj Zizek. The Fright o f Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and 
Post-Theory. BFI Publications, 2001.
Among the primary virtues of Slavoj Zizek’s indefatigable, somewhat compulsive 
efforts to explicate the strange topographies of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory 
and contemporary cultural politics are his ready wit and his facility in drawing upon 
his familiarity with diverse topics, from the finest points of Kantian and Hegelian 
metaphysics to slapstick teenage comedies. Both of these are evident in his recent 
book The Fright o f Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and Post- 
Theory, based on a series of lectures delivered at London’s National Film Theatre 
on the films of the Polish director. Significantly, the self-proclaimed aim of this 
study of Kieslowski is “not to talk about his work, but to refer to his work in order 
to accomplish the work of Theory” (9). Zizek’s modus operandi throughout all of 
his writings is to formulate highly abstract philosophical and theoretical medita­
tions by referring to the widest possible variety of North American and European 
cultural products, such as films, literature, music, and jokes. This is what he means 
by t4the work of Theory,” further specified as elaborating the notion of the subject 
under investigation, as opposed to merely detailing its history. Over the years 
Zizek has strengthened his theoretical compositions by choosing examples to size
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and has developed new theories by allowing the cultural products that do not quite 
fit to propel his theories in new directions. The films of Krzysztof Kieslowski, he 
claims, do just this.
The focus of Zizek’s book is theory rather than Kieslowski, and he proves this 
by adjusting information on the filmmaker and his films to suit his needs. The 
book’s title is taken from one of Kieslowski’s reasons for his decision to move from 
documentary to feature filmmaking in the mid-1970s. After years of documenting 
daily life, provoked by the realization that he might capture something that he 
would rather not have seen, Kieslowski switched to feature films. He felt that by 
creating fictional scenes he could portray the more private aspects of life without 
harming anyone, and therefore avoid the worries that lead to dishonesty or leave 
the human subjects of documentaries without protection. Zizek describes this 
predicament beautifully: “[T]he only proper thing to do is to maintain a distance 
towards the intimate, idiosyncratic, fantasy domain— one can only circumscribe, 
hint at, these fragile elements that bear witness to a human personality” (73). Zizek 
does not mention that the footage for one of Kieslowski’s documentaries was taken 
by the police, indirectly implicating him in the solution of a murder case. Herein lies 
the plus/minus of Zizek’s book: for better and for worse, Fright is all about theory 
and events only get in the way. Zizek finds in Kieslowski’s films a penchant for 
creating multiple versions of films with different contingent outcomes and endings 
in documentary as well as in fiction, which furthers Zizek’s disbelief in the legiti­
macy of real events. In documentary, he claims, “We are shown what ‘really hap­
pened,’ and suddenly, we perceive this reality in all its fragility, as one of the 
contingent outcomes, forever haunted by its shadowy doubles” (77). According to 
Zizek, reality is actually “lost” in documentary instead of merely hidden as the 
possibility of contigent outcomes overwhelms the outcome presented on the screen 
(121). These worthwhile meditations are, unfortunately, offset by Zizek’s unwilling­
ness to separate life off-camera from life on-camera. He places a rectangular screen 
in front of Kieslowski’s own life and early death and claims that it fits within his 
paradigm of lost reality. In doing so he ignores the very basis of the filmmaker’s 
move from documentary to fiction and undermines a potentially excellent argument 
about documentation and contingency.
Zizek examines the fright of real tears carefully and succinctly, with the exper­
tise of a good theorist who understands the fragile nature of a field that attempts to 
encompass both fiction and life. However, his analysis fails to reflect this under­
standing in all of its complexities and is weak in comparison to the existing body of 
criticism on the director. Zizek writes, “If documentaries intrude into and hurt the 
personal reality of the protagonists, fiction intrudes into and hurts dreams them­
selves, secret fantasies that form the unavowed kernel of our lives” (77). It is 
difficult to discern the fact from the fiction in Zizek’s own work, which makes it 
interesting but in some cases less valuable than customary scholarship. When 
Zizek turns the director’s death into the fulfillment of a wish in Freudian terms, a 
statement or at the very least the contingent outcome of the choices that he made, 
it is hard to tell if he understands that he is dealing with fact, not fiction. By 
disregarding very real life consequences, which are usually much more complicated
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than the sanitized choices presented in fiction, he is able to fit the trajectory of 
Kieslowski’s career and life choices to his theory.
What, then, is the true subject of Zizek’s book? The question is tied to ques­
tions of whether and how he confronts “the shared implicit set of beliefs and norms 
that regulate our interaction” (3), and whether he makes the case for the exceptional 
status of Kieslowski and his films; namely, that they function as “concrete univer- 
sals” in relation to the total field of film theory. In this particular instance, the former 
takes the form of a polemic directed against the advocates and practitioners of 
“Post-Theory,” meaning a cognitivist and historicist approach to film criticism. 
Such criticism fails to discern the dialectical alternative to “mid-level empirical re­
search and cultural studies historical relativism [and] the old-fashioned metaphysi­
cal TOE [Theory Of Everything],” which “concerns the paradoxical relationship 
between universality and its constitutive exception” (14). Its basic procedure is to 
attempt to generate general principles or definitions by discerning underlying simi­
larities or patterns in a sufficiently large set of examples. What it fails to notice in 
following this procedure is that each and every individual example distorts or col­
ors the general rule in a unique way. “Post-Theory” also fails to “reconstruct ‘all’ of 
the narrative content [of a given film]” (58) due to its refusal to acknowledge the 
unconscious dimension of narrative. The debate between theory and post-theory 
within the discipline of film studies is further presented as emblematic of a crisis in 
cultural studies in general, which in Zizek’s reading is caught in the predicament of 
being split between an objective “neutral” but totally opaque language of experts 
and a Leibnitzean universe of multiple self-enclosed and mutually untranslatable 
languages. The problem with post-theory in this account is its refusal to confront 
this split and to assert a new universality. In repressing the essential place of the 
universal within the identity of the particular, post-theorists lose that very identity/ 
meaning.
The arguments for Kieslowski’s exceptional status, given Zizek’s focus on the 
universal/theoretical dimension, as well as the fact that the book has its origins in a 
series of lectures, are perhaps understandably less well developed and often diffi­
cult to discern. Symptomatic of this is the fact that a crucial point in his argument 
about Kieslowski’s films—namely, the standard Lacanian thesis regarding the im­
possibility of the sexual relationship in that during the sex act each partner is never 
fully present (to the other) but rather always mediated through fantasy—is made 
without a single reference to Kieslowski, but instead is elaborated by way of 
Nabokov’s Lolita, Cuban machismo, Wagner, Goethe, and The Thornbirds, among 
others. As in all of his books it appears as a digression from the main discussion of 
ethical choice in Blind Chance, The Double Life ofVeronique, and Three Colours: 
Red. Thus, to the extent that there is an overarching argument it is one involving a 
totalizing reading of Kieslowski’s work as presenting the ambiguity of a choice 
between “resignation at the missed encounter which asserts the gap [of the failed 
suture], or the closed loop of fantasy which fills this gap” (181).
The book is divided into three sections: the universal, the particular, and the 
individual. Each section is organized around a central opposition, which upon 
reflection can be seen as a version of the ambiguity Zizek finds in Kieslowski, but
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which in his own argument is decidedly not ambiguous. This series of oppositions 
are made explicit in the final section, when he asks rhetorically, “Is the topic of our 
first chapter, the choice between Theory and Post-Theory, not yet another case of 
the ethical choice between event and Being, between ethics and morality, between 
mission and life?” (148). It becomes clear in Zizek’s reading of the films and in 
subsequent readings of Zizek’s book that the first term in each of these pairs is the 
privileged one.
The first section contains the argument against post-theory, largely through a 
discussion of the Hegelian notion of “concrete universality” and the move from the 
failure of classical film theory’s “suture” to what Zizek calls “interface.” This 
building of a theoretical framework is familiar ground for Zizek, and he carries it off 
with characteristic aplomb. The first part of his case for theory over post-theory 
hinges on his particular interpretation of Hegelian dialectics, which by now is 
familiar to his readers. Hence, the comprehensibility and forcefulness of this case 
will in large part depend upon how compelling and/or useful one finds this interpre­
tation and its corresponding application to cultural and aesthetic objects. His 
central claim in this section is that the empirical approach of post-theory, while 
achieving valuable results in film analysis and criticism, and with historical specific­
ity, can never attain true (“concrete”) universality in its claims or judgments. This 
is because it overlooks how “at every stage its particular content is not only a 
subspecies of the universality of the total process: it ‘hegemonises’ this very uni­
versality” (24). The empirical-conceptual divide is manifested in post-theory’s 
inability to account for uncanny reversals of the relationship between subject and 
object, in psychoanalytic terms, the “Gaze” (34), the unconscious, and ultimately, 
the symbolic order as a realm of fiction or potentiality that sustains our very sense 
of reality (61-68). In Zizek’s conception, this sense of reality is only achieved 
through suture, which in one formulation is the point of inscription within a signi­
fying structure or symbolic order of this structure/order’s absence (32). (The no­
tion of suture is obviously a complex and highly debated one. In the work under 
consideration, it is not fully elaborated. While this is among the book’s shortcom­
ings, a thorough critique of Zizek’s deployment of this term is beyond the scope of 
this review.) The question now becomes: WTiat happens when the suture fails? 
Zizek’s answer is the most original part of the book. According to Zizek, interface 
steps in to mark this failure self-reflexively. Interface, then, is a technique whereby 
the gap between the subjective and objective dimensions of experience is pre­
sented within the narrative as a spectral object, in some cases the same as the 
Lacanian objet petit a. His examples include a glass ball in The Double Life of 
Veronique and Citizen Kane, an image of Valentine on a red billboard in Red, and a 
reflection of Julie’s doctor in her eye in Blue. This uncanny spectral dimension is 
not merely a supplementary, superficial feature that can be ignored or removed, but 
rather an essential part whose exorcism would lead to the dissolution of reality/ 
meaning itself, as in the example of the glass ball in Citizen Kane signaling Kane’s 
death. Another demonstration of interface, according to Zizek, occurs when a third 
image is added to a standard shot/reverse-shot in order to disturb the viewers’ 
sense of on-screen reality. Interface, he explains, urges the viewer to ponder the
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existence of another dimension and to doubt the conclusiveness of the reality 
presented on the screen. The main attraction in this most exciting of Zizek’s theo­
retical queries requires suspended doubt: Zizek often forgets that the shot/re- 
verse-shot is just as imaginary as the spectral image.
Zizek establishes that filmmakers often script an ethical dilemma for their char­
acters based on the decision of whether or not to pursue their talents and dreams in 
spite of risk of physical danger to themselves and others. This vocation-versus- 
calm-life dilemma, he claims, runs through the work and life of Kieslowski and forms 
a basis for theoretical inquiry into the relationship between intention, action, con­
tingency, and outcome in the second section. He rightly sees the mission-life 
alternative as the thesis of Blind Chance and The Double Life o f Veronique, and 
points to elements of it in Three Colours: Blue, White, Red and parts of Decalogue. 
For Zizek this multiplicity of contingent outcomes based on an opposition between 
professional objectives and private existence is a forerunner of digital technology, 
which allows more and more for the creation of multiple fictional universes and the 
sophisticated interface. Zizek wants either to ascribe a necessary trilogy to these 
multiple universes, claiming that the third in the row of outcomes is presented in 
film as the only real one (Blind Chance) or to claim that in the case of two possible 
outcomes the filmmaker is simply breaking the illusion of a time-space continuum 
by allowing his characters to travel through time ( Veronique, Red). It also opens 
the door for Zizek to ask, though unfortunately more in the context of Tarkovsky 
than Kieslowski, about “the ambiguity of the role of chance in Kieslowski’s uni­
verse: Does it point toward a deeper fate secretly regulating our lives, or is the 
notion of fate itself a desperate stratagem to cope with the utter contingency of 
life?” (107). According to Zizek, Kieslowski tackles this question by creating char­
acters who attempt to recreate reality and by making multiple versions of some of 
his films. His examples seem random and scattered and, in spite of his attempt to use 
them to do the work of theory, related more thematically than theoretically—though 
they deal with similar issues, they offer little motivation for understanding Zizek’s 
theoretical abstractions.
The most disappointing part of Zizek’s study is the section on Kieslowski’s 
ten-segment masterpiece about the Ten Commandments made for Polish television 
in 1988, Decalogue. Because this series of television films has received much 
attention outside of Poland, there is a relatively good deal of available scholarship 
on the subject in English, and many of Ziiek’s own ideas, particularly pertaining to 
interface, could have been elaborated and proven with the help of this scholarship. 
He chooses to disregard it, and in doing so hurts his own arguments. Ziiek claims 
that the majority of interpreters of the films are wrong (he never names these inter­
preters) and insists upon a strict (in italics!) Hegelian correlation between the ten 
films and the Ten Commandments. As if claiming that there is a correct order to the 
Ten Commandments (which actually differ depending on one’s religious beliefs) 
were not mistaken enough, Zizek also turns to a random assortment of Western 
cultural products to prove that theory can define a correlative system within 
Decalogue in spite of such contrary evidence as the filmmaker’s expressed inten­
tions and the actual topics of the films. Zizek claims that each segment of Decalogue
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refers to the commandment of one number higher, so that Decalogue: One refers to 
the Second Commandment, and so on until Decalogue: Ten, which he claims refers 
to the First Commandment. The results are hit-and-miss. The author devotes one 
paragraph to each film segment, asserting at times the obvious (Decalogue: Five, 
about a young murderer, is associated with “Thou shalt not kill”) and at times the 
absurd (Decalogue: Six, about a teenage peeping Tom and the unmarried, lonely 
object of his desire, is associated with “Thou shalt not commit adultery”). He 
attempts to analyze Decalogue: One in detail, but unfortunately he makes basic 
mistakes regarding the action of the film that render his reading untrustworthy. In 
short, he completely misses opportunities to develop his theories and gives a false 
impression of the films.
For all of his attempts to link dissimilar concepts, Zizek’s work is best when it 
distinguishes between seemingly similar ones. A highlight of the book is his expla­
nation of the distinction between ethics and morality in the third section. Ethics, 
according to Zizek, is the refusal to compromise one’s attitude, while morality is 
moral compassion (137). Kieslowski’s films, he states, are about ethics rather than 
morality. In this way they demonstrate a theoretical shift. Zizek demonstrates this 
difference by reading the shift from morality to ethics in a few films, concentrating 
mainly on Hilary and Jackie, In the Company o f Men, and The Talented Mr. Ripley, 
but venturing a bit into Decalogue, The Double Life ofVeronique, and The Scar as 
well. He finds that the distinction between ethics and morality becomes apparent 
when the intentions and actions of two characters are depicted in opposition to 
each other. Effect, then, takes a back seat to intention in these characters’ dilemmas. 
When they are able to demonstrate willingness to help others by revealing their 
good intentions, they portray moral compassion. If, however, characters retain 
their self-accepted code of behavior, regardless of the harmfulness or helpfulness 
of their actions, they are acting in an ethical way. Zizek’s explanations of this 
distinction are expert, engaging, and positively provocative, leaving the reader to 
search for yet more examples and explanations.
Indeed, when Zizek is right he is so wonderfully right that the problems with 
his scholarship become pronounced. Is Zizek himself acting morally or ethically 
when he writes of Kieslowski’s films? Refusing to compromise his ideas, he insists 
upon the commandment-film correlation even when it destroys the argument. Simi­
larly, he insists upon the three-part, three-chapter structure, even though the final 
chapters weaken the book as a whole. He is extreme in his insistence upon making 
reference to unrelated films. He makes mistakes when summarizing films. He leaves 
gaps in his arguments when the films’ plots contradict his ideas. For example, he 
chooses to read Blue and No End together because they both begin with the tragic 
loss of a woman’s husband but end in dramatically different ways. He analyzes the 
message of the wife’s double loss in Blue, in which she learns that her late husband 
had been having a long-term affair throughout their marriage. She therefore effec­
tively loses both her husband and her memories of a faithful marriage, and it is the 
recognition of the second loss that allows her to move forward with her mourning 
and her sexual life at the end of the film. Zizek, however, avoids mention of the 
attendant message of No End. In this film, the widow searches for evidence that her
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husband had been unfaithful, but when she finds none she realizes that she is 
unable to live without him. The outcome is suicide instead of rebirth. Zizek’s 
explanation of the inevitability of a third fantastical element in sexual relationships 
contradicts the plot development of No End, while omission of No End from the 
analysis contradicts his explanation of multiple outcomes. He chooses to avoid the 
dilemma by concentrating on outcome rather than contingency, effectively weak­
ening his main argument.
The main problem, though, is that the promising distinction between morality 
and ethics is lost at the end of the book, and the dilemma of calm life versus mission 
fares little better. An unrelated passage on human rights and religion ( “In our post­
political, liberal-permissive society, human rights are ultimately reduced to the rights 
to violate the Ten Commandments” [155]) and an awkward comment on Blue (“[I]t 
is the ideal film to satisfy the needs of a Brussels bureaucrat who returns home in 
the evening after a day full of complex negotiations on tariff regulations” [177]) 
unfortunately wrap up the book. Not that it seems to matter at this point. Zizek 
uses Kieslowski’s films and random United States and Western European films as 
tools, which allow him to theorize. The films themselves are secondary—always 
already insufficient, imperfect—to theory.
Polish cinema fans and film historians may want to think twice before investing 
in this book. In spite of a sincere interest in Kieslowski and film theory, The Fright 
of Real Tears stubbornly dissatisfies by trying to act as a lone trail-blazer on a busy 
superhighway. There simply is much better, more pertinent, more intelligent schol­
arship available. Other scholars have taken better care to recall correctly the plots 
of Kieslowski’s films and to consider in depth the religious and social circum­
stances behind their production. Zizek’s dismissal of this scholarship weakens his 
arguments, as does the dismissal of so much of Kieslowski that absolutely belongs 
to, even drives, the “work of Theory.” Where is Ingmar Bergman in Frightl W^here 
is the Lodz Film School? WTiere are Kieslowski’s college classmates and col­
leagues? Why does Zizek expend his letters on back-handed comments about 
national cuisines, German billboards, and a footnote that rearticulates the history of 
modem philosophy around the central term “fucking” instead of delving deeper 
into film? The short answer may be that The Fright o f Real Tears alternates be­
tween the meaningful practice of theoretical inquiry and the seemingly endless 
chore of cultural criticism, where nothing that is Western is acceptable and every­
thing that is not Western is misplaced or mentioned briefly in a bibliographic endnote. 
Zizek asks the reader to oscillate with him between these two poles. He often builds 
highly complex arguments out of seemingly insignificant details and ignores bla­
tant exceptions to the point he is trying to make. Moreover, he leaves the most 
disappointing comments for the last pages of the book and even adds a picture in 
a pathetic attempt to prove his point. Although one might agree with his Hegelian 
reading of the exception that proves the rule, in the case of his treatment of Kieslowski 
we might prefer a Freudian reading and assert that sometimes an exception is just an 
exception.
